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Chapter 17
The Vagueness of “Biodiversity” and Its 
Implications in Conservation Practice
Yves Meinard, Sylvain Coq, and Bernhard Schmid
Abstract The vagueness of the notion of biodiversity is discussed in the philo-
sophical literature but most ecologists admit that it is unproblematic in practice. We 
analyze a series of case studies to argue that this denial of the importance of clarify-
ing the definition of biodiversity has worrying implications in practice, at three lev-
els: it can impair the coordination of conservation actions, hide the need to improve 
management knowledge and cover up incompatibilities between disciplinary 
assumptions. This is because the formal agreement on the term “biodiversity” can 
hide profound disagreements on the nature of conservation issues. We then explore 
avenues to unlock this situation, using the literature in decision analysis. Decision 
analysts claim that decision-makers requesting decision-support often do not pre-
cisely know for what problem they request support. Clarifying a better formulation, 
eliminating vagueness, is therefore a critical step for decision analysis. We explain 
how this logic can be implemented in our case studies and similar situations, where 
various interacting actors face complex, multifaceted problems that they have to 
solve collectively. To sum up, although “biodiversity” has long been considered a 
flagship to galvanize conservation action, the vagueness of the term actually com-
plicates this perennial task of conservation practitioners. As conservation scientists, 
we have a duty to stop promoting a term whose vagueness impairs conservation 
practice. This approach allows introducing a dynamic definition of “biodiversity 
practices”, designed to play the integrating role that the term “biodiversity” cannot 
achieve, due to the ambiguity of its general definition.
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17.1  Introduction
The Convention on Biological Diversity defines biological diversity or biodiversity 
as “the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of 
which they are part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of 
ecosystems (United Nations 2013).” This now classical definition is largely dis-
cussed in the philosophical literature for being exceedingly vague and in need of 
clarification (Sarkar 2005; MacLaurin and Sterelny 2008; Meinard et  al. 2014; 
Santana 2014). By contrast, most ecologists consider that this vagueness is unprob-
lematic in practice (Mace et al. 2012).
In this chapter, we argue that this vagueness does have worrying implications in 
practice, at three levels: it can impair the coordination of conservation actions, hide 
the need to improve management knowledge and cover up incompatibilities between 
disciplinary assumptions. Our purview in this chapter is accordingly mainly practi-
cal: we aim to address ecologists, conservation biologists and practitioners, with the 
objective of convincing them that debates on the definition of biodiversity may have 
concrete implications. The problems that we thereby highlight all stem from the 
lack of a clear and shared definition of biodiversity. Biodiversity is certainly not the 
only concept that suffers from being vaguely defined, and in many cases this vague-
ness does not create much problems. Accordingly, our aim here is not to claim that 
vagueness is a problem in itself. Our more modest aim is to argue that, in the very 
specific case of biodiversity, it does have worrying consequences.
Indeed, in this specific case, formal agreements among various actors on the term 
“biodiversity” can hide profound disagreements on the nature of conservation and 
ecological issues. This is reminiscent of a classical problem in decision modelling 
(Bouyssou et al. 2000), for which the proven solution is for interacting actors to 
articulate a commonly accepted formulation of the key questions structuring their 
interaction. In line with this view, we propose that, although the notion of biodiver-
sity does not unify biodiversity sciences in a transparent, rigorous way, such a uni-
fication may be achieved by clarifying a concept of biodiversity practices, understood 
as coherent collaborative interdisciplinary efforts to tackle commonly identified 
environmental and conservation problems. We take advantage of insights from the 
philosophical literature to champion this approach and to argue that, although a 
definitive definition of these biodiversity practices might be unreachable, the task to 
constantly improve definitions, taking seriously conservation biologists’ and con-
servation practitioners’ value-laden stances, is crucial to the enrichment and 
improvement of conservation theories and practices. If we may paraphrase Burch- 
Brown and Archer (2017), although we emphasize that one cannot hope to reach a 
definitive answer to the question “what is biodiversity?”, our approach hence pro-
poses a “defense of biodiversity” that consists in championing a collective effort to 
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constantly improve our understanding of the value-laden practices gathered under 
banner of “conserving biodiversity”.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. In Sect. 17.2, we first 
show that, despite its being seemingly simple and unequivocal, the definition of 
“biodiversity” is exceedingly vague. Vagueness in itself is not necessarily a prob-
lem. But Sect. 17.3 uses cases studies to show that, in the case of “biodiversity”, this 
vagueness creates problems in practice. In Sect. 17.4 we then explain our proposed 
solution. Section 17.5 briefly concludes.
17.2  The False Transparency of the Definition of Biodiversity
The vagueness of definitions of “biodiversity” has been extensively studied in the 
philosophical literature (Sarkar 2005; MacLaurin and Sterelny 2008; Meinard et al. 
2014), but for lack of a concrete understanding of its implications for conservation 
science and practices, this debate has been largely confined to philosophical discus-
sions without affecting real-life conservation and ecological practices (for a notice-
able exception, see Delong 1996). Let us first explain why we claim that definitions 
of “biodiversity” are vague.
17.2.1  Diverging Definitions of “Biodiversity” Coexist
A first example will illustrate how deceptive is the idea that the definition of “biodi-
versity” is clear and unequivocal. Let us look at two prominent approaches to biodi-
versity, articulated by a leading author in conservation biology and a leading author 
in ecosystem ecology: Sarkar (2005) and Loreau (2010).
Loreau (2010) does not delve into definitional debates. He uses a definition very 
similar to the one of the CBD, stating that “biodiversity […] includes all aspects of 
the diversity of life—including molecules, genes, behaviors, functions, species, 
interactions, and ecosystems” (p. 56). The fact that he uses such a sketchy definition 
suggests that he takes the definition to be unproblematic and consensual. By con-
trast, Sarkar (2005) explicitly tackles the definitional issue. Following Maclaurin 
and Sterelny (2008, p. 8), one can summarize his approach by stating that, accord-
ing to his definition, “‘biodiversity’ [means] whatever we think is valuable about a 
biological system” (Maclaurin and Sterelny’s interpretation of Sarkar’s theory can 
be criticized, but for the purpose of the present chapter, we will not delve into this 
exegetic debate).
A striking difference between Loreau’s (2010) and Sarkar’s (2005) definitions is 
that, whereas Sarkar’s definition explicitly mentions values, Loreau’s definition 
exclusively mentions purely biological concepts and objects. Despite this major dif-
ference, Sarkar explicitly claims that he use the concept of biodiversity in an uncon-
troversial and widely shared sense: he even writes that his approach captures the 
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“consensus view” (p. 145). And Loreau makes the same claim, though implicitly, 
since he admits that there is no need to delve into definitional issues. Despite the 
major difference between their respective definitions, both authors hence claim that 
their approach captures the general understanding of the concept.
Hence, although Loreau (2010) and Sarkar (2005) use the same term and take for 
granted that they understand it in the same way as everyone else, they actually 
understand it markedly differently. Can this kind of misunderstanding have practi-
cal implications? In the sections to follow, we argue that, in the case of biodiversity, 
it can.
17.2.2  The Various Disciplinary Studies “of Biodiversity” Do 
Not Study the Same Things
The literature presenting the numerous measures and indexes of biodiversity is 
extensive (Muguran and McGill 2011). It is commonplace to notice that the differ-
ent disciplines (encompassing what will thereafter be termed various “biodiversity 
studies”) respectively favor different indexes because they capture concepts that are 
better adapted to their subject-matter. The term “biodiversity” is used in articles 
from these various disciplines mostly in introductions and conclusions, whereas 
discipline-specific concepts such as species richness (Fleishman et al. 2006), phylo-
genetic distances (Faith 1992) or functional traits or attributes (Petchey and Gaston 
2002; Mason et al. 2003) replace it in the methods and results sections (Meinard 
2011). Similarly, environmental economists often use the term “biodiversity” to 
introduce and justify their research, but rapidly switch to disciplinary concepts, 
such as “naturalness” (Eichner and Tschirhart 2007) or “perceived diversity” 
(Moran 1994). The same is true of the other disciplines concerned with biodiversity. 
Accordingly, although they all claim to study biodiversity, the various biodiversity 
studies actually produce results that account for different objects, properties and 
processes (Maclaurin and Sterelny 2008).
The concept of biodiversity itself is never used in articulating results, in any of 
these disciplines. It is mostly confined to introductions and conclusions, where it 
plays the role of a catchword.
17.2.3  The Various Disciplinary Studies “of Biodiversity” 
Presuppose that they Study Various Aspects 
of a Common Entity
By using the notion of biodiversity in their introductions and conclusions, all these 
heterogeneous studies presuppose, at least implicitly, that the various objects, prop-
erties and processes that they study are aspects of a common entity: biodiversity 
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(here we use the term “entity” in a purportedly very large sense, encompassing all 
sorts of ontological units, such as objects, properties, natural kinds, and so on). They 
do not claim that their concepts or measures represent all of biodiversity, but that 
there is a common entity, biodiversity, which is partially captured by their favorite 
measures and concepts.
In the current literature on biodiversity, the various studies simply state that their 
subject-matter is an aspect of the putative entity biodiversity, without explaining 
what this entity is supposed to be. What is this putative common entity supposed to 
be?
17.2.4  Defining “Biodiversity” Thanks to the Notions 
of Diversity or Variety Is Insufficient to Identify  
such a Common Entity
The literature on indexes and measures of biodiversity is notably vague on the issue 
of a proper identification of this common putative entity—biodiversity. The usual 
explanation identifies it as a specification of a more general entity: the property 
diversity (Maris 2010). Biodiversity would be the diversity of living things (Gaston 
and Spicer 2004), along genetic, phylogenetic and functional dimensions (Purvis 
and Hector 2000).
This approach bears some seeming credibility because “diversity”, and synonyms 
in ordinary language such as “variety”, belong to the everyday language and thus 
seem clear and self-evident. Intuitively, diversity is a property characterizing groups 
of individuals, depending on the number of individuals and on their similarities and 
dissimilarities. But the precise roles of numbers, similarities and dissimilarities, and 
the metrics used to measure them, are not elucidated at this intuitive level.
To determine whether “diversity” truly captures a coherent notion, axiomatic 
studies have tried to formalize the properties associated with it (Weitzman 1992; 
Nehring and Puppe 2002). They thereby showed that these properties are highly 
variable and that the notion of diversity is accordingly deeply ambiguous (Gravel 
2008) (in other words, what these studies show is that, whereas it seems self-evident 
at first sight that diversity is a property, in fact the term “diversity” captures different 
sets of properties in different contexts, which makes it questionable to claim that 
“diversity” refers to a property properly speaking). The terms “diversity” or “vari-
ety” thus function like a term such as “adaptation”. “Adaptation” has different 
meanings in various subfields of evolutionary biology, it has a markedly different 
meaning in medical physiology, and yet other meanings in ordinary language. The 
same holds true for “diversity” and “variety”. Within disciplines or, more precisely, 
within subfields, these terms are relatively unambiguous and generally well-defined, 
but their meaning varies between disciplines or subfields. As a consequence, these 
terms cannot be unambiguously used in both ways at the same time. Either one 
relies on subfield-specific, technical and well-clarified definitions of the terms 
“diversity”, “variety”, etc.―but in that case one can no longer draw upon the self- 
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evidence of these terms in everyday language. Or one relies on everyday language―
but in that case, one has to face the fact that ordinary language does not delineate 
coherent notions of diversity or variety. In both cases, using the terms “diversity” or 
“variety” in a general definition of biodiversity is problematic, because one cannot 
take for granted that others will understand the notion in the intended way. Therefore, 
if buttressed on general terms like “diversity” or “variety”, a general definition of 
biodiversity does not single out a unique entity, and is therefore useless to support 
the idea that “biodiversity” refers to a common entity.
Here again, the comparison with “adaptation” is illustrative. A rigorous evolu-
tionary biologist would never use the term “adaptation” when talking to lay people 
or to physiologists without specifying that his technical understanding of the term is 
very specific. The evolutionary biologist knows that his interlocutors think that they 
understand the term “adaptation”, and he knows also that, in a sense, they are right 
to think that they understand the term. But he also knows that they understand the 
term in another sense, rather than the one he has in mind. Therefore, it is natural for 
him to clarify the meaning of the term. This crucial step is the one that is missing in 
the case of “biodiversity”.
The theoretical considerations developed in this Sect. 17.2 may appear purely 
formal, without implications for concrete conservation science and action. The goal 
of the following section is to demonstrate that the reverse is true.
17.3  How False Transparency Creates Concrete Problems 
for Conservation Science and Action
In order to explain the concrete problems created by the seemingly purely theoreti-
cal reasoning spelled out in Sect. 17.2, let us now take three concrete case studies, 
each illustrating a specific kind of problem.
17.3.1  The False Transparency of “Biodiversity” Can Impair 
the Coordination of Interacting Conservation Actions
Misunderstandings created by the false transparency of “biodiversity” can have det-
rimental implications at the level of practical conservation management, as can be 
illustrated by the story of the management of the Bel-Air valley in South-west 
France (Gereco, unpublished report 2014). This is a small valley (Fig. 17.1) contain-
ing a rich mosaic of aquatic and humid habitats in a karstic system close to semi-arid 
grasslands and upstream water meadows (surrounding the Charente River).
This valley shelters a population of otters (Lutra lutra) and a massive population 
of Louisiana crayfish (Procambarus clarkia). The latter is an invasive species hav-
ing major detrimental impacts on the functioning of aquatic ecosystems (Angeler 
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et al. 2001; Rodriguez et al. 2005). However, its impact on Mammals populations is 
modestly positive (Correira 2001), and from the point of view of otter-watchers it 
has the advantage to turn otters’ spraints into red, greatly facilitating the observation 
and monitoring of otter populations. The above report also unveiled the presence of 
Japanese knotweed (Reynoutria japonica Houtt., 1777), an invasive plant with 
deeply damaging impacts on wetland ecosystems.
The valley is managed by an environmental association, Perennis. The down-
stream water meadows are protected under the Habitat Directive (HD, a cornerstone 
of the European Union policy to maintain biodiversity: European Commission 
1992) and are accordingly managed by another environmental association, the Birds 
Protection League (“LPO”). Both actors act according to management schemes 
explicitly aimed at conserving “biodiversity”.
Fig. 17.1 The Bel-Air valley
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But on closer examination, it appears that Perennis understands “biodiversity” in 
a Sarkar-like manner. Indeed, as amateur naturalists, they value first and foremost 
the emblematic otters: for them promoting biodiversity mainly means managing the 
otter population. Because crayfish makes it easier to observe otter, and because they 
have not witnessed any impact of knotweed on otters yet, they do not see invasive 
species as a prominent topic in their agenda to conserve “biodiversity”. By contrast, 
directed as it is by European guidelines applicable to the entire Natura 2000 net-
work, the LPO has to conceive of its objective to preserve biodiversity in a way that 
puts more emphasis on ecological functioning. In particular, following the guide-
lines spelled out in Evans and Arvella (2011), its management actions have to 
actively tackle the problems created by invasive species populations. Accordingly, 
for the LPO, conserving biodiversity in this area implies managing the crayfish and 
knotweed populations (or at least it implies a need to carve out a strategy assessing 
the kind of invasive mitigation actions that can be performed, and the cogency of 
implementing them in the light of their cost and likelihood of success).
Perennis’ management strategy aims at “conserving biodiversity”, but this means 
protecting the otter population, and does not mean tackling the invasive species 
issue; similarly, the LPO’s strategy aims at “conserving biodiversity”, but this time 
it means tackling the invasive species issue. Both actors could agree when compar-
ing their objectives: they both strive to “conserve biodiversity.” But if it dismisses 
the invasive issue when managing the valley, Perennis actually jeopardizes any 
attempt to tackle this very issue downstream. The formal agreement on “biodiver-
sity” hence hides a deep disagreement on what has concretely to be done.
At this stage, one might retort that misunderstandings like the one sketched 
above can easily be solved if the actors talk to each other about the concrete actions 
they want to implement. This is certainly true, and this example is indeed somewhat 
schematic. Our personal experience however suggests that, in real-life management 
situations, such seemingly trivial disagreements can persist. This is because the 
term “biodiversity” provides a common vocabulary that various actors can use to 
express very different objectives, which can all too easily lead them to fail to see the 
underlying divergences. In the present work, we obviously do not claim to have 
quantitatively demonstrated that such problems often arise in concrete conservation 
situation. Our more modest claim is that it can arise.
17.3.2  The False Transparency of “Biodiversity” Hides 
the Need to Improve Scientific Knowledge to Solve 
Complex Management Problems
The case of the Bel-Air valley provided a first illustration of how a concrete man-
agement problem can remain unseen because various actors fail to see the need to 
compare their respective understandings of “biodiversity”. In this case, the problem 
arises at the level of the interactions between actors implementing conservation 
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actions. But a deeper problem can arise when innovative solutions and new manage-
ment knowledge are needed to solve more complex conservation issues. In such 
cases, the false transparency of “biodiversity” can hide the need to improve scien-
tific knowledge.
An example illustrating this idea is given by the management of so-called “habi-
tats of community interest”, when biological invasion mitigation conflicts with 
habitat conservation (see Jeanmougin et al. 2016 for a deeper investigation of this 
conflict). “Habitats of community interest” (HCI) are natural or semi-natural habi-
tats constituting the Natura 2000 network, as application of HD (European 
Commission 1992). HCI are typically defined in European guidelines (European 
Commission 2013) and more detailed regional scale manuals (e.g. Bensettiti 2001–
2005) by lists of floristic species. For some HCI, these lists contain numerous inva-
sive species (see Jeanmougin et al. 2016, SI-Table 3). For example, this is the case 
of the HCI “Constantly flowing Mediterranean rivers with Paspalo-Agrostidion spe-
cies and hanging curtains of Salix and Populus alba (Habitat 3280)”, whose  presence 
has been recently reported in the lower Taravo River area (Corsica, France) 
(Fig. 17.2) (Gereco, unpublished report 2015).
Eight of the 34 index species of this habitat (Paspalum distichum L., 1759, 
Paspalum dilatatum Poir., 1804, Xanthium strumarium L., 1753, Symphyotrichum 
subulatum var. squamatum (Spreng.) S.D.Sundb., 2004, Dysphania ambrosioides 
(L.) Mosyakin & Clemants, 2002, Amaranthus retroflexus L., 1753, Cyperus 
eragrostis Lam., 1791and Erigeron canadensis L., 1753) are considered invasive 
species according to various European, national or local databases. HD, as a politi-
Fig. 17.2 Paspalo-Agrostidion and curtain of Salix purpurea along the Taravo river
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cal tool to maintain biodiversity, promotes the maintenance of HCI. On the other 
hand, the control and eradication of invasive species is also a central objective of 
many European initiatives to maintain biodiversity, such as the DAISIE (Delivering 
Alien Invasive Species Inventories in Europe) program and the recent European 
Directive on Invasive Species (Beninde et al. 2015).
In the case of habitats like HCI 3280, there is an antagonism between the inva-
sive approach and the habitat approach. Indeed, if management actions achieve to 
mitigate populations of the above-cited invasive species, this will unavoidable imply 
that the area identifiable as HCI 3280 will decrease. Conversely, if management 
actions achieve an increase of the area occupied by HCI 3280, this will be accom-
panied by an expansion of populations of the above-cited invasive species. 
Consequently, elaborating a management scheme in areas like the lower Taravo is 
problematic, because two actions that are typically considered keystones of any 
biodiversity conservation strategy (invasive species mitigation and habitat conserva-
tion) are antagonist in such cases.
However, there is no scientific study or publication tackling this question (see 
Jeanmougin et al. 2016 for a bibliographic exploration quantitatively corroborating 
this idea). According to the database (ETC-BD 2015) constructed as part of the 
European-wide evaluation of the conservation status of HCI (European Union 
2015), this habitat is present in no less than five countries in Europe (France, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal). Management schemes are hence devised and imple-
mented all year long in the whole European Mediterranean region to manage this 
HCI, but there is no scientific guideline to decide how to solve the contradiction 
between the objectives to mitigate biological invasion and to promote the conserva-
tion status of habitat 3280.
Like most complex problems at the science-policy interface, this specific prob-
lem certainly has multifarious origins, having to do with the complex challenges in 
(1) translating ecological theory into practice (Knight et al. 2008), (2) defining the 
relevant expertise (Burgman et al. 2011), (3) choosing the relevant scientific para-
digms to ensure operationality (Jeanmougin et  al. 2016), (4) drawing the line 
between scientific information and advocacy (Brussard and Tull 2007), (5) assess-
ing the proper place of scientific knowledge in the process of policy making 
(Josanoff 2012) and (6) entrenching the importance of an open diffusion of informa-
tion on conservation practices (Meinard 2017a). We do not claim here to do justice 
to all these aspects, their interrelations and their relative importance in the genesis 
of problems such as the one of the above introduced lack of knowledge on HCI 3280 
management and invasive species. Our more modest purpose is the following. We 
want to show that, by granting a key-role in the coordination between disciplinary 
approaches to a vague term like “biodiversity”, one tends in all likelihood to render 
invisible the kind of knowledge gap at issue in our example. We accordingly do not 
claim to unfold a scientific demonstration here, but rather to hypothesize a possible 
mechanism that occurred to us thanks to our own field experience.
We propose that this mechanism is simply that specialists of invasive species 
stress the importance of controlling invasive species and present such a control as a 
prominent means to maintain biodiversity. But as non-specialists of habitats, they 
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simply accept what specialists say about the self-evidence that maintaining HCI is 
also unquestionably good for biodiversity. Specialists of habitats behave in a sym-
metric way. Everyone thus agrees with the overarching objective to maintain biodi-
versity, everyone is careful not to question the expertise of one’s interlocutor, and no 
one sees the need to improve knowledge and to carve out innovative management 
solutions in complex cases such as the one of habitat 3280.
As a consequence in the field, at the end of the story the resulting management 
scheme is most of the time decided more or less arbitrarily by political decision- 
makers or consultants on the basis of political, economic or circumstantial consid-
erations. In the case of the Taravo River, the management scheme produced in 2014 
(Lindenia, unpublished report 2015) does not mention this problem.
17.3.3  The False Transparency of “Biodiversity” Hides that 
Various Approaches Are Based on Incompatible 
Postulates
A more subtle, but no less important problem arises when interactions with non- 
ecological disciplines are involved. Let us start by illustrating the problem with an 
example: Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s ecological-economic study of a fishery 
ecosystem. Their aim is to establish how to organize fisheries given that the exploi-
tation of a given species can have complex repercussions on the broader ecosystem. 
In their study system, human consumers buy items of one species (Pollock, Theragra 
chalcogramma) on markets and thereby indirectly impact other species due to 
between-species interactions in the ecosystem. This indirect impact then alters the 
provision of various ecological services. For example, the sheltering function of 
kelp (Laminaria spp.) can be altered, which has an impact on the populations of 
Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and Pink salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbu-
sha), which in turn alters the so-called “consumption services” (MEA 2005) for 
consumers of the latter species.
Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s solution is that if taxes on harvesting activities 
or caps on harvest, calibrated thanks to a precise knowledge of the functioning of 
the ecosystem, are implemented, demand will drop, overfishing will cease, kelp will 
recover, etc., and consumers will end-up being more satisfied.
The economists who authored this study claim that they provide insights that are 
complementary to those provided by ecologists to resolve a commonly identified 
problem—the problem of how to manage a complex ecological-economic system. 
Unfortunately, the way they see this problem is strikingly different from the way 
many ecologists see it. The compatibility of their prescriptions with prescriptions 
stemming from biological studies can accordingly become problematic.
Indeed, Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s understanding of the problem is based 
on a moral assumption—that is, an assumption about what is morally legitimate for 
scientists to do. They assume that consumers’ preferences are given, and that the 
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results of their study should not lead to a modification of consumers’ preferences. 
Consequently, they do not integrate in their models the fact that being aware of the 
ecological impact of their act may change the behavior of the consumers. In techni-
cal economic terms, this assumption is encapsulated by the fact that human behav-
ior is modeled using a predetermined utility function (Orléan 2011), whose 
parameters are not fed-back by the results of the study. Consumers are assumed to 
behave has if they were maximizing a function whose arguments are prices and 
quantities of goods they buy on markets. The knowledge of the system does not 
appear in the function: when a given consumer learns to know that his buying 
Pollock has impacts on populations of Salmon, this does not make any difference in 
his behavior on the Pollock market.
Such predetermined utility functions are often presented, like many other eco-
nomic modelling tools, as morally neutral tools providing empirical complements 
to moral discussion (e.g. Scharks and Masuda 2016). When presented like this, it 
seems that predetermined utility function, as well as other modelling tools widely 
used in ecological-economic studies, can be used in conservation initiatives without 
interfering with the ethical motivations underlying the latter. Following the same 
logic, when an ecosystem ecologist works on a specific ecosystem process and an 
economist computes the economic value of an ecosystem service based on this pro-
cess, it might look as though the two can work together and the end-result of their 
conjoint work is no less ethically neutral than the original ecological study of the 
ecological process. This repeatedly rehearsed logic is, however, largely acknowl-
edged to be flawed: predetermined utility functions are not morally neutral model-
ing tools (Sen 2002; Hausman and McPherson 2006; Meinard et al. 2016). Using 
these tools means assuming that the results of the study should not lead to a modifi-
cation of consumers’ preferences: if consumers prefer x to y, the study should never 
aim at modifying this fact. This is not a technical constraint: implementing a feed-
back between the results of the model and preferences is not technically difficult 
(Lesourne et al. 2006). It is a moral stance: using predetermined utility functions is 
a means to promote the anti-paternalistic attitude to leave preferences as they are 
(Kolm 2005; Sagoff 2008) and to advocate that the satisfaction of preferences as 
they are is an acceptable, or even desirable, objective (Sagoff 2008).
This moral stance might seem reasonable enough—why should the economist 
think that he knows better than the consumer what the latter should prefer? But this 
moral stance can be problematic from the point of view of conservation sciences, 
because convincing people that their preferences are ill-conceived is a prominent 
means to achieve conservation targets. Many applied ecological studies are even 
openly based on moral assumptions that are diametrically opposed to the above one. 
Take for example the adaptive management approach (Norton 2005), according to 
which management practices should be seen as experiments from which managers 
can learn and thereby both improve their knowledge of the managed system and 
adjust the criteria that they use to evaluate alternative courses of actions (Lee 1993). 
Contrary to Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s model, this approach assumes that 
people’s objectives and preferences are responsive to improvements of their knowl-
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edge of the ecological constraints (Maris and Bechet 2010), and that enabling such 
improvements is precisely one of the motivations to study these systems.
Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s solutions are solutions to the problem as they 
see it, constrained by moral assumptions that are not generally accepted by biolo-
gists. This does not mean that their approach is irredeemably irrelevant for biolo-
gists, but that using it to identify solutions to the problem as biologists see it requires 
important reinterpretations and adaptations. Eichner and Tschirhart (2007) however 
eschew the clarification of this point, and their argument is accepted in the ecologi-
cal literature without a discussion (as illustrated by its extensive mention in Naeem 
et al. 2009). It is difficult to see why biologists do not assess the relevance of this 
model more critically. Our interpretation here is that the false transparency of the 
notion of biodiversity plays a role in the explanation of the existence of this blind 
spot. Indeed, this false transparency makes it look as though Eichner and Tschirhart 
(2007)‘s is self-evidently relevant, since it claims to be about biodiversity. We can-
not overemphasize that, obviously enough, we do not claim that the term “biodiver-
sity” is the unique, or even the main, culprit in failures of ecological-economic 
studies of fisheries. The precautions articulated above when analyzing the former 
case study apply here as well. Our point is more modestly that, by granting a key- 
role in the coordination between disciplinary approaches to a vague term like “bio-
diversity”, one tends in all likelihood to render invisible the fact that different 
disciplinary approaches are anchored in different moral assumptions. Like in our 
former case study once again, we do not claim to unfold a scientific demonstration 
here, but rather to hypothesize a possible mechanism, accounting for one possible 
cause among others behind the shortcomings of the models that we analyze.
Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s model is just one example, but it is a paradig-
matic one, for two reasons.
First, the moral assumption mentioned above is so entrenched in the economic 
literature that some authors (e.g. Orléan 2011) use it to characterize the vast major-
ity of the current economic literature. This does not mean that economic studies 
necessarily make this assumption, since heterodox approaches reject it (Lesourne 
et al. 2006), but rather that this assumption is bound to create recurrent problems in 
economics/ecology interactions.
Second, the problem witnessed in our example between ecology and economics 
exists between ecology and other disciplines. For example, numerous anthropologi-
cal studies presenting themselves as studies of biodiversity acknowledge that they 
are based on moral postulates (e.g. Mougenot 2003). But if ecologists and anthro-
pologists do not investigate whether their respective moral assumptions are 
 compatible, the possibility for them to provide coherent prescriptions for action is 
unwarranted.
To sum up the lesson from this third case study: when various disciplines present 
themselves as studies of different aspects of a common object—biodiversity—they 
tend to ignore that, if they are based on incompatible moral assumptions—as they 
often are—the very meaning and usefulness of their interactions are questionable.
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17.4  The Way Forward
In the former section, we explored various concrete examples that allowed us to 
illustrate different kinds of problems created by the false transparency of “biodiver-
sity”. The order of presentation was one of increasing complexity and increasing 
explanatory content: the first example was a simple case of diverging conservation 
objectives, the second one involved a more interpretative analysis, and the last one 
eventually allowed us to articulate the crux of the problem created by the false trans-
parency of “biodiversity”: collaborative works or disciplinarily studies that con-
ceive of themselves as tackling different aspects of a common object fail to 
acknowledge the need to ensure that they tackle different parts of a similarly identi-
fied problem. They are caged in an illusory shared ontology of the entity 
biodiversity.
One might argue that the simple solution to all the problems mentioned above 
would be to get rid of the term “biodiversity” and stop pretending that the various 
“biodiversity sciences” have anything in common. Such a radical solution (champi-
oned, for example, by Santana 2014) could be counterproductive though, by dis-
couraging interdisciplinary collaboration. This would be at odds with the widely 
accepted idea that interdisciplinary approaches are needed to tackle the globally 
pressing environmental challenges (Norton 2002; Loreau 2010b).
The aim of the present section is to delineate possible solutions based on the idea 
that the need to arrive at commonly identified problems should be taken seriously. 
We first sketch what such a requirement would concretely mean in the case of our 
three concrete examples, and then we take a broader view.
17.4.1  Facing the Issue of Problem Identification
A leitmotif for contemporary decision analysts, especially those working in multi- 
actor settings, is that decision-makers requesting decision-support often do not pre-
cisely know for what problem they really need support (Bouyssou et  al. 2000; 
Tsoukias et  al. 2013). For example, private firms can be aware that they have a 
problem in their production process because the output is lower than expected. But 
they don’t know if the problem is that they are inefficient or that they were unreal-
istic when setting their objectives or that their overall conception of what they aim 
to do was flawed, etc. They know that they have a problem, but can only articulate 
a rough, ambiguous formulation of it. More interestingly, various stakeholders, for 
example involved in the management of a complex system such as a watershed, may 
have only a very partial understanding of the problem that that are nonetheless in 
charge of tackling. Clarifying a better formulation of the problem, eliminating 
ambiguities and vagueness often associated with the terms spontaneously used to 
request decision support, is accordingly a first, critical step for decision analysis 
(Belton et al. 1997; Rosenhead 2001). Given the nature of the problems identified in 
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this chapter, a similar clarification, on a case-by-case basis, of the precise nature of 
the problem for the resolution of which (often interdisciplinary) interactions are put 
to use, may substantially improve the situation.
In the case of the Bel-Air valley, instead of resting content with the fact that they 
both manage their respective areas according to a scheme that mentions the preser-
vation of biodiversity as an overarching aim, the two managers should answer the 
following questions. “What is the precise nature of the functional links between the 
Charente water meadows and the habitats of its tributary, the Bel-Air?”, “What are 
the functional consequences of the absence of a control of the crayfish and Japanese 
knotweed populations in the Bel-Air on the ecological functioning of the nearby 
water meadows?”, “Would it be justified that the manager of the water meadows 
contribute (through money or workforce) to help the manager of the Bel-Air to 
implement specific conservation measures?” These are difficult questions, but 
sweeping them under the carpet by framing the discussions with the vague consen-
sual terms of “biodiversity” does not make them any less urgent.
In the Taravo case, the question “How to manage the river area in such a way as 
to promote biodiversity?” is meaningless, because, in this case, the two kinds of 
stakeholders in charge of the site management have distinct concrete objectives and 
would implement very different and potentially contradictory action. These differ-
ences and discrepancies, however, are hidden by the use of the common word “bio-
diversity”. In this case, a clear management policy and scientific knowledge are 
simply lacking. The very notion that HCI 3280 is protected under European legisla-
tion is nonsense so long as there are no scientific answers to the questions: “Is it 
possible to define this habitat on the basis of other criteria than species lists?” and 
“Is it possible to preserve this habitat while controlling invasive species at the same 
time?” These scientific issues are currently not investigated because, mainly due to 
the fact that problems are formulated in the vague terms of “biodiversity”, these 
genuine, underlying problems do not surface. Similarly, the national and local strat-
egies regularly produced and updated by environmental institutions are of little use 
if they do not clarify how the various aspects of biodiversity should be ordered when 
they conflict in a practical management situation. If such a ranking were available, 
even if scientific studies turned out to demonstrate that it is impossible to define 
habitat 3280 without referring to invasive species, a management program could be 
defined for the lower Taravo on an informed, legitimate basis.
Lastly, in the case of economics/ecology interactions, they would gain much 
transparency if, instead of rehearsing the vulgate of the supposed biodiversity/well-
being link, ecology/economics interactions were systematically anchored in a 
 common identification of the answers to the following questions: “For the purpose 
of a given decision-making on a conservation issue, what kind of economic infor-
mation is useful?”, “Should we take an anti-paternalistic stance like most econo-
mists, or should we rather take a more pedagogic stance and admit that ecological 
knowledge can rightfully be used to improve everyone’s decisions?” and “More 
generally, what kind of prescription for action is legitimate for biodiversity scien-
tists to formulate on the basis of scientific models?”
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17.4.2  A Broader View
The above paragraphs might leave the reader somewhat unsatisfied, since we simply 
spelled out the questions that the actors should ask themselves in the specific cases 
we considered. Isn’t it possible to elaborate a more general approach, liable to help 
solve problems created by the false transparency of “biodiversity” in a more general 
setting? We believe that it is possible, and here we sketch our proposal.
17.4.2.1  What Do We Need to Define?
A common view, although often implicit, in the literature, is that the definition of 
the term “biodiversity” has to be an objectivist definition. An objectivist definition 
is a description of the independent, preexisting entity to which the term to be defined 
refers. For example, an objectivist definition of the term “Mars” is a description 
enabling to identify the planet to which the term refers—an object independent 
from and preexisting our specifying that the term “Mars” refers to it. When one 
claims to define “biodiversity” by specifying preexisting independent objects, prop-
erties or processes, one attempts to provide an objectivist definition.
We have argued above that the ambiguity of the current general definition of 
biodiversity can create damaging problems, but it is unlikely that objectivist defini-
tions can prevent such problems from arising. Our analysis of the case of ecological- 
economic models rather suggests that, unless it makes an explicit reference to the 
value-laden aspirations that make sense of the various biodiversity sciences, a defi-
nition can hardly be useful to prevent such problems.
We therefore have to carefully examine the reason why we need a definition. We 
want to make sure that the various approaches gathered under the umbrella of the 
term “biodiversity” can provide relevant insights to coherently resolve common 
problems. The term “biodiversity” provides a form of unification between different 
approaches and disciplines. But this form of unification is defective when it comes 
to doing justice to this reason, because it covers up misunderstandings between 
approaches. What we need is another form of unification, liable to prevent such 
misunderstandings. Our suggestion is that this unification should rather be  buttressed 
on a general definition of biodiversity practices, understood as a coherent collabora-
tive effort from various disciplines to tackle commonly identified environmental or 
conservation problems.
Our suggestion is therefore to shift the focus from the definition of biodiversity 
conceived as a putative entity to the definition of biodiversity practices, emphasiz-
ing the value-laden aspirations underlying them. This suggestion might seem odd at 
first sight, because it looks as though one needs to have a prior concept of biodiver-
sity in order to talk about “biodiversity practices”. Underlying our suggestion is the 
idea that such a criticism stems from a linguistic illusion. Our language treats “bio-
diversity” as a substantive, which makes it look as though “biodiversity practices” 
necessarily are practices towards the entity to which the substantive refers. But we 
have argued that there is no such entity biodiversity to which “biodiversity” refers. 
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Whereas our language gives the false impression that one cannot understand what 
biodiversity practices are without antecedently understanding what biodiversity is, 
our suggestion is that the reverse is the case: in order to understand what biodiver-
sity is, what we have to do is to start by thinking through what biodiversity practices 
are (Sarkar’s (2005) approach is very similar to ours in this respect; for an analysis 
of the differences, see Meinard 2017b).
The search for such a definition of biodiversity practices is bound to be unavoid-
ably largely tentative and interpretative, but it would be misleading to presuppose 
that this creates a serious problem. The reason is that, when one defines a practice, 
the suitable definitions cannot be definitive objectivist definitions, because the very 
act of defining can modify the practice, and this modification can in turn modify the 
definition. In such a case, the definition does not identify an independent, preexist-
ing practice: it rather participates in the construction of the practice.
The vast literature on the definition of the terms “art” and “artistic practices” 
perfectly illustrates this idea. Although everybody intuitively knows what these 
terms mean, there is a vast literature striving to capture definitions of these terms. 
Unlike biodiversity scientists, art theoreticians have never accepted to rest content 
with the apparent self-evidence of the central notions of their field: they have end-
lessly kept trying to find better definitions. It turns out that, in so doing, they have 
greatly contributed to the enrichment of artistic practices. Indeed, the various defini-
tions of art by prominent art theoreticians have aroused creative responses by artists, 
who have (more or less consciously) modified their artistic practices to highlight the 
restrictiveness of these definitions or to explore the avenues they had opened up 
(Pignocchi 2012).
We argue that, as biodiversity scientists, we should follow this example of art 
theoreticians. We should always include an explicit definition of the global value- 
laden biodiversity practices into which we see our studies as being embedded, in 
such a way as to dissipate misunderstandings like the one highlighted in Sect. 17.3. 
The point of such references is not just to harbor values, but to prevent misunder-
standings. In particular, the value-laden features mentioned in such definitions must 
be the ones that are crucial to the identification of the general problems that biodi-
versity sciences should be devoted to solve. If such definitions were systematically 
formulated, this would launch a creative process by which other biodiversity scien-
tists would modify their practices to criticize the shortcomings or exploit the 
strengths of each definition, and in turn suggest new definitions, etc.
17.4.2.2  A Tentative Definition
Let us exemplify our approach by articulating our own tentative definition of biodi-
versity practices:
Biodiversity practices are studies, actions, strategies based on the aspiration that the devel-
opment and diffusion of ecological knowledge can lead people to improve their course of 
action by developing responsible, informed and long-term decision strategies and prefer-
ences, mindful of the environmental constraints.
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This definition is not the result of a grand deductive, philosophical or scientific, 
reasoning. It is a tentative interpretation of the studies, actions, strategies that our 
own experience as conservation scientists and practitioners allowed us to experi-
ence—and that our case studies above exemplified. This definition is obviously nei-
ther definitive nor uncontroversial. In some contexts, it might appear to be too vague 
and in need of qualifications or discussions, and the emergence of misunderstand-
ings in the future may require reformulations. But as it stands, it is the kind of defi-
nition needed to clarify misunderstandings like the one unveiled above.
For example, if Naeem et al. (2009) had started by articulating such a definition, 
based on the identification of the problems tackled by biologists, they would most 
probably have faced difficulties to encompass Eichner and Tschirhart (2007)‘s 
model in it, because these authors do not understand the problem of biodiversity 
management in the same way as most biologists do. Naeem et  al. (2009) would 
accordingly have admitted the necessity to critically scrutinize the relevance of this 
model for conservation and ecological purposes. A fruitful critical discussion could 
have ensued and damaging misunderstanding could have been possibly dissipated.
One seeming problem with this approach is that it is likely that the problems 
tackled by biodiversity sciences will change over time. Encapsulating them in a 
single definition of biodiversity practices might accordingly risk encouraging 
immobility. The tentative definition of biodiversity practices just introduced is, 
however, liable to play a clarifying role without encouraging immobility because it 
harbors two crucial features. These two features characterize what we will term a 
“dynamic definition”.
First, since it is granted the status of a tentative definition, it is open to discussion 
and accordingly flexible enough to continuously adapt to new insights and 
developments.
Second, since it is meant to be used to critically assess the relevance of various 
studies for one another, the very act, by a given scientist, to formulate such a 
 definition and test it on a given study can lead him to modify his own practice instead 
of rejecting the study he assesses. Defining a practice can thereby lead to a modifica-
tion of this very practice, and this modification can in turn modify the definition.
In this dynamic approach, the best thing that can happen now to the tentative 
definition of biodiversity practices introduced above is that it be taken seriously 
enough by biodiversity scientists for them to criticize it, thereby launching the co- 
evolution of biodiversity practices and their definition.
17.5  Conclusion
The term “biodiversity” is diversely understood by various users, and its general 
definition is vague. Here we have taken advantage of several case studies to show 
that this vagueness, which is usually taken by biologists to be innocuous at a theo-
retical level, can create problems at the concrete level of practical interactions 
between various approaches to biodiversity issues. The problems studied here share 
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a common structure. In these various settings, the term “biodiversity” is used by 
various actors to link their respective approaches. The resulting impermeable divi-
sion of labor, based on the formal but illusory agreement on the objective to study 
or conserve “biodiversity”, hides the fact that the various approaches can promote 
mutually incompatible goals, eventually leading in conservation practice to self- 
defeating actions. To end such deadlocks, we have claimed that a clarification, on a 
case-by-case basis, of the precise nature of the problems for the resolution of which 
interdisciplinary interactions are put to use is a critical step. It can make the various 
misunderstandings and contradictions currently impeding management practices 
due to the false transparency of “biodiversity” visible and subsequently help to 
resolve them. This case-by-case approach then allowed us to develop a more general 
proposal, delineating a path towards the resolution of problems created by the false 
transparency of “biodiversity”. The logic of this path can be summed up in four 
steps:
 1. There is need to clarify a general definition of biodiversity practices, understood 
as a coherent collaborative effort from various disciplines to tackle environmen-
tal or conservation problems commonly identified on the basis of coherent value- 
laden aspirations.
 2. General definitions of biodiversity practices are always tentative, because the 
very act of defining them can lead to a modification of our theoretical and practi-
cal approaches to biodiversity theorizing and management.
 3. In our contributions, we should all make it a rule to always define the global 
value-laden biodiversity practices into which we see our studies as being embed-
ded, in such a way as to prevent, as far as possible, misunderstandings with other 
biodiversity studies or actions.
 4. We should seize every opportunity to discuss and criticize the definitions put 
forward by the other biodiversity scientists who have followed the steps above.
Although they have never formally articulated it, art theoreticians and artists have 
historically followed a similar path, which proved to be very fruitful. Our hope is 
that biodiversity scientists can learn from this example.
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